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  Title	COLUMN: The Strategic Fallout: How ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah Could Leverage the October 7 Hamas Terror Attacks
  ID	4523328
  External ID	7334974049
  Author	Mahmut Cengiz
  Published Date	Nov. 26, 2024, 7:14 a.m.
  Summary	Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III hosts Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant at the Pentagon, March 26, 2024. (Photo: DOD) Over a year has passed since Hamas’s October 7 terror attacks, yet th
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  URL	https://www.hstoday.us/featured/column-the-strategic-fallout-how-isis-al-qaeda-and-hezbollah-could-leverage-the-october-7-hamas-terror-attacks/
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• Content Details

  Content ID	2695143
  Key	80be874e-f29a-41f5-a475-a5eca9d7326e
  Content	Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III hosts Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant at the Pentagon, March 26, 2024. (Photo: DOD) Over a year has passed since Hamas’s October 7 terror attacks, yet their political reverberations continue to dominate global discussions. Some analysts have drawn parallels between these attacks and Israel’s own “September 11,” framing them as a pivotal moment in regional geopolitics. For critics of Prime Minister Netanyahu, the attacks were seen as a way to shift focus from his ongoing corruption scandals. Others argue that certain elements within the Israeli government exploited the attacks to justify the forced displacement of Palestinians. Meanwhile, the intensifying conflict has stirred regional outrage, heightening concerns about its potential October 7 Hamas Terror Attacks to trigger broader instability across the Middle East. Iran has been quick to capitalize on the situation, positioning itself as the foremost regional power opposing Israeli actions. However, the larger strategic question remains: how will other militant groups—such as Hezbollah, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda—exploit the fallout from these attacks? Each of these organizations stands to gain from the political and ideological turmoil, using the situation to further their own agendas and recruit new supporters. The October 7 attacks have sparked debates about whether Hamas miscalculated the potential consequences. A key question is whether Hamas would have carried out the attacks had it known they would lead to the loss of its two top leaders, Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, as well as many commanders, and result in a heavy toll on Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. In response, Israel’s counteroffensive destroyed 70% of Gaza’s buildings and killed over 44,000 Palestinians. Despite these significant losses, some scholars argue that Hamas may still gain from the attacks. Israel’s harsh response has once again isolated it in the region, undermining its recent efforts to improve relations with neighboring countries. Hamas likely anticipated Israel’s strong retaliation, which has further marginalized the Palestinian population. Since Hamas has historically recruited supporters from families who have lost members to Israeli forces, the deaths of more Palestinians could serve as a recruitment tool, particularly among their children, helping to swell Hamas’s ranks. The war has been costly for Hezbollah, with both its leader, Hasan Nasrallah, and his presumed successor, Hashem Saffiedine, being killed by Israeli forces. This loss, coupled with Iran’s alleged involvement in orchestrating the October 7 attacks, has further escalated the conflict. In response, Iran activated its militia groups in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. These groups in Iraq and Syria, coordinated under the umbrella of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, targeted American and Israeli forces across the Middle East. The group was responsible for the killing of three U.S. Marines in the Tower 22 US military outpost in Jordan in January 2024. The Houthis in Yemen were also involved, attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea. Among the Iran-backed militias, Hezbollah has been the most active. Prior to October 7, Hezbollah had conducted only two attacks in 2023. However, following the attack, it launched 280 missile and drone strikes against Israel for the rest of the year. Israeli forces initially focused on Hamas in Gaza but later shifted their attention to Hezbollah along the northern border. The loss of Hezbollah’s longtime leader represents a major blow to the group. While losing such a key figure could destabilize the group, retaliatory rhetoric and shifting regional dynamics may create new opportunities for Hezbollah and attract more recruits. Despite Nasrallah’s death, Hezbollah’s strong financial support from Iran, along with its involvement in criminal activities, will help the group maintain its resilience. While undergoing a leadership transition, Hezbollah is likely to retain its influence in regional politics, as it remains under the control of the Iranian regime. Ongoing recruitment opportunities are likely to benefit Salafi-jihadist groups in the region. Although Hamas may face challenges in rebuilding its strength in the short term, it is unlikely to abandon its regional objectives. Instead, the group is expected to seek revenge and escalate attacks, with Israeli overreactions increasing sympathy for Hamas in the region. As a result, radicalization trends are anticipated to rise both locally and in Western countries. The contradictory responses from Western governments raise important questions about their stance on justice. By either remaining silent or supporting Israeli overreactions that cause significant collateral damage and civilian casualties, Western governments risk damaging their international reputation and exacerbating radicalization. Self-radicalized individuals, who are difficult to track, represent one of the most dangerous forms of terrorism today. As such, this type of terrorism is likely to grow, particularly in Western countries. Hamas may face challenges in recovering in the short term, but its members and new recruits are likely to join groups like ISIS or Al Qaeda in the region. Both organizations stand to gain from the ongoing conflict. Although ISIS and Al Qaeda have not recently carried out major attacks in the West, their affiliates continue to pose serious security threats both regionally and globally. Factors such as ongoing economic and political grievances, the repression of Muslim communities, and the spread of strict interpretations of the Qur’an by Salafi jihadist movements—often supported by Gulf States—provide a fertile environment for these groups to maintain and grow their support. ISIS now operates mainly through loosely connected affiliates. While it has lost several leaders in Syria due to U.S. military operations, the group has expanded its reach across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Its Afghan affiliate, ISIS-Khorasan, has grown in prominence, replacing the Taliban as a key regional threat. The group’s influence is increasing in multiple Afghan provinces, driven by dissatisfaction with Taliban rule. ISIS affiliates in the Sahel, like ISIS-Greater Sahara, and in Nigeria, through ISIS-West Africa Province (ISWAP), continue their attacks into 2023 and 2024. ISWAP has also extended its operations into Niger and Cameroon. Additionally, ISIS branches in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique are drawing attention due to their violent activities. While these groups’ attacks may not receive extensive media coverage in the West, they are expanding into neighboring countries. The ISIS branch in Somalia remains relatively inactive, but the lack of a strong state presence makes the country a potential safe haven for the group. Although it is unlikely that ISIS will establish a branch in the West Bank or Gaza due to Israeli military operations, Hamas members may join ISIS affiliates in Syria or Yemen, potentially targeting U.S. and Israeli forces in the Middle East. Al Qaeda does not have a centralized core organization like ISIS, but it operates through loosely connected regional affiliates. Using an umbrella structure, Al Qaeda has formed groups like HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) in Syria, which resulted from the merger of seven local jihadist groups, and JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) in the Sahel, formed from the merger of four jihadist groups. Al Shabaab in Somalia and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) also contribute significantly to regional instability. In 2024, these groups have made Al Qaeda more of a threat than ISIS affiliates. For example, TTP has carried out more than 400 attacks in western Pakistan, targeting both civilians and military forces. Al Shabaab remains a potent threat, using suicide bombings, IEDs, and vehicle-borne IEDs. Its activities, along with JNIM’s actions in the Sahel, are drawing more international attention. The instability following coups in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso has created power vacuums that JNIM has filled. JNIM primarily targets military forces and has recently expanded its operations into neighboring countries like Togo and Benin. In the Middle East, Al Qaeda’s influence is represented by groups like Ahrar al-Sham and HTS in Syria. Although HTS operates mainly in the Idlib province, it still conducts over 100 attacks each year. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains active in Yemen, and its use of drones makes it particularly dangerous. In 2024, AQAP, JNIM, and HTS have all launched drone attacks. Al Qaeda seems to be a more likely destination for radicalized Hamas members in the short term than ISIS. It is possible that some of these radicals could return to Gaza in the future to carry out retaliatory attacks. Al Qaeda is better positioned to target Israel in the region, partly due to its support from the Iranian government. Sayf al-Adl, the successor to Ayman al-Zawahiri (who was killed in a drone strike), is allegedly based in Iran and continues to lead the organization from there. The existing relationships between Iran-backed militias and Al Qaeda groups further strengthen Al Qaeda’s influence. For example, the Houthis in Yemen provide drones to AQAP and have smuggling networks with Al Shabaab. Given these connections, Iran may direct Hamas radicals to Al Qaeda, which already has strong ties with Palestinian militant groups. In conclusion, the global response to the evolving threat of terrorism remains insufficient, as demonstrated by the failure to prevent the October 7 attacks. The ongoing conflict, marked by Israeli overreactions and the Western world’s handling of the crisis, is likely to fuel further radicalization, not only within the region but also across Western nations. Hezbollah, steadfast in its goals, is poised to continue posing a threat to Israel and U.S. forces, especially with its new leadership and growing access to advanced technologies. In the short term, radicalized Hamas members may increasingly look to Al-Qaeda as a more viable destination for their operations, given Al-Qaeda’s growing capabilities and its strategic ties to Iran. This shift could significantly strengthen Al-Qaeda’s position in the region, making it an even more formidable threat to Western and Israeli interests in the future.
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  Publisher Name	HSToday (#3120)
  Publisher URL	https://www.hstoday.us/
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  Trust Flow Score	16
  Citation Flow Score	16

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  Data Source Name	Quantexa News (#5)
  Data Source Type	news
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